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CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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332 State Capitol 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
Re: Second Citation of New Authority, 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 
Utah Supreme Court No. 860331 
MAR 1 1990 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Dear Mr. B u t l e r : 
We submit this letter to the Court in accordance with Rule 
24(j)r Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Our purpose is to cite 
and explain a new case on an important issue. That case, which 
we just discovered, is Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep 
Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). It was decided after we (the 
State Respondents) had filed our Supplemental Brief. 
In the court below, Judge Banks granted the Respondents' 
respective motions to dismiss, after "having reviewed the entire 
file," including the evidence put in the record in connection 
with Appellant Colman's motion for preliminary injunction. (See 
the State's Supplemental Brief pp. 2-3.) 
In our Supplemental Brief (p. 3) we stated: "Judge Banks' 
decision is well supported by the record.2" Our footnote 2 
addressed Colmanfs request that this Court not consider the 
record now before the Court. 
We think our "Statement of the Case," pp. 1-7, including 
footnote 2, discredits Colman's request. We think law and logic 
allow this Court to refer to the full record, as did Judge Banks. 
In addition to the precedents and arguments given in our 
Supplemental Brief, we now refer the Court to Flying Diamond, 
supra, 776 P.2d at 622. 
In our Supplemental Brief's footnote 2, we noted that Judge 
Banks did not expressly treat this case as one for summary 
judgment. For example, he did not make specific findings of 
fact. But, as we noted there, Judge Banks did expressly state he 
had "reviewed the entire file" before rendering his decision. 
The "entire file" included all the record evidence, including 
certain dispositive facts that were uncontradicted. 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
March lf 1990 
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Flying Diamond notes that generally a trial court errs by 
not making findings on all material issuesf and that the matter 
usually must be remanded "for the purpose of allowing the trial 
court to make such findings." 776 P.2d at 622. 
"However, a remand is not necessary if the evidence in the 
record is undisputed and the appellate court can fairly and 
properly resolve the case on the record before it." Id. (em-
phasis added). 
That precisely is one of the arguments we advanced in our 
Supplemental Brief. That rule applies here to obviate a remand 
in our case. 
The Court decided Flying Diamond without remanding, "[b]e-
cause the issue * * * [was] controlled entirely by the Agreement 
and the wholly undisputed parol evidence * * *." Id. 
Our case is similar. If Colman has a protectable property 
right in this case, it depends on the lease agreement between 
Colman and the State. In our view, the lease eviscerates Col-
man's case as a matter of law. (See the State's Supplemental 
Brief at 38-39; and the State's primary brief at 5 n.lr and pp. " 
and 34 n.19.) And the lease is but one of several undisputed, 
dispositive items of evidence in the record. The Court can and 
should decide this case on the record and as a matter of law. 
For a discussion of other undisputed and dispositive facts, 
please refer to the State's briefs. (See especially the State's 
Supplemental Brief at pp. 1-7, 38-39, 46, 48 n.32, and 56 n.37; 
and the State's primary brief at pp. 2-6, 7, 16, 18-23, 25, and 
34 n.19. ) 
We respectfully submit that, as a matter of law, Colman has 
not stated a claim, and that the Court can decide this case 
without requiring the parties to undergo further litigation. 
R. DOUGLAS CREDILLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
RDC/ac 
cc: Carol Clawson 
Ridd Larson 
